We examine a sample of 18 banks operating in the UK between 2001 and 2006 to provide for the first time evidence on the association between the efficiency of UK banks and two important aspects of board structure, namely board size and composition. We first use data envelopment analysis to estimate the technical, allocative, and cost efficiency of banks, and then use Tobit regression to investigate the impact of the board structure on these measures of efficiency. We estimate three specifications, one for each measure of efficiency, where the impact of each board aspect is examined individually and in conjunction with each other. In all the specifications we control for bank size, capital strength and time trends. We find some evidence of a positive association between board size and efficiency which is however not robust across our estimations. The composition of the board has a statistically significant and positive impact on efficiency across all our specifications.
Introduction
The issue of structure of the board of directors as a corporate governance mechanism has received considerable attention in recent years from academics, market participants, and regulators. It continues to receive attention because theory provides conflicting views as to the impact of board structure on the control and performance of firms, while at the same time the empirical evidence is inconclusive. Despite the volume of research in the area of corporate governance, surprisingly little is known about the effectiveness of boards in banking organisations as most empirical studies exclude financial firms from their sample (Adams and Mehran, 2005) . However, numerous studies have emphasised the distinguishing characteristics of the banking industry and the importance of corporate governance for banks (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Levine, 2004; Barth et al., 2006; Zulkafli and Samad, 2007) .
The guidelines on banks' corporate governance published by the Basel Committee (1999 Committee ( , 2006 give particular emphasis on the board of directors by discussing several principles that outline the role and composition of the board. For example, the 1999 report states that: "The board of directors should ensure that senior management implements policies that prohibit (or strictly limit) 
activities and relationships that diminish the quality of corporate governance, such as: conflicts of interest; leading to offices and employees and other forms of self-dealing, and providing preferential treatment to related parties and other favoured entities" (p. 5).
Furthermore, "The board of directors is ultimately responsible for the operations and financial soundness of the bank". (p. 6). In addition to the importance attached to the role of the board, the Basel Committee reports also highlight the belief that the inclusion of qualified non-executive directors on the board can enhance independence and objectivity, and bring a number of benefits to the bank. Specifically, the 2006 report states that "banks should have an adequate number and appropriate
composition of directors who are capable of exercising judgment independent of the views of management, political interests or inappropriate outside interests" (p. 7).
The purpose of the present study is to provide empirical evidence of the impact of board structure, specifically board size and board composition, on the efficiency of UK banks. The importance of our study lies not only in the fact that empirical research (mentioned above) focusing on the corporate governance of banks is limited, but also most importantly in the observation that, as in the non-financial sector, the results from the few empirical studies that focus on the banking industry are generally mixed. Furthermore, we differentiate our study from the majority of previous studies in banking by measuring performance with an efficiency frontier technique, as opposed to using Tobin's Q and/or financial ratios (e.g. return on assets-ROA). Specifically, we use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to estimate technical, allocative and cost efficiency of banks. Berger and Humphrey (1997) and Bauer et al. (1998) emphasise that efficient frontier approaches seem to be superior compared to the use of traditional financial ratios. Berger and Humphrey (1997) also point out that the frontier approaches offer an overall objective numerical score and ranking, an efficiency proxy to comply with the economic optimization mechanism. Barth et al. (2006) and Caprio et al. (2007) mention that if bank managers face sound governance mechanisms and are well-managed, it is likely that they will allocate capital and the savings of the society more efficient than otherwise. However, as Isik and Hassan (2003) point out only a few US and international studies link bank efficiency with corporate control and governance 1 (e.g. Pi and Timme, 1993; Berger 1 Berger and Mester (1997) use a sample of U.S. commercial banks and examine the relation between bank's highest holder registration for public trading with SEC and the proportion of stock owned by insiders and outsiders with cost and profit efficiency. Isik and Hassan (2003) investigate whether the affiliation of the CEO and public trading of banks have an impact on efficiency in the Turkish and Mester, 1997; Amess and Drake, 2003; Isik and Hassan, 2003) . To the best of our knowledge, only Pi and Timme (1993) have examined the relationship between cost efficiency and board independence using a sample of US banks, and our study seeks to pursue this issue in the UK banking sector.
The rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the related literature. Section 3 presents the data, variables and methodology used in the study. In Section 4, we discuss our results, whereas the last section concludes our study.
Background discussion

Board size
Board size is considered to be a crucial characteristic of the board structure. Large boards could provide the diversity that would help companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental uncertainties (Pfeffer, 1987; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994) . But, as Yermack (1996) mentions, coordination, communication and decision-making problems increasingly impede company performance when the number of directors increases. Thus, as an extra member is included in the board, a potential trade-off exists between diversity and coordination.
Jenson (1993) appears to support Lipton and Lorsch (1992) who recommend a number of board members between seven and eight. However, board size recommendations tend to be industry-specific, since Adams and Mehran (2003) commercial banking sector. Amess and Drake (2003) investigate UK building societies but focus on the relationship between total factor productivity change and executive remuneration rather than on board size and composition and efficiency. Hardwick et al. (2003) , Zelenyuk and Zheka (2006) , and Destefanis and Sena (2007) also relate corporate governance issues with efficiency but provide evidence from non-banking sectors in the UK, Ukraine, and Italy respectively. As noted above, there are also several studies that define corporate governance more broadly and examine the link between ownership and banks' efficiency (e.g. Berger et al., 2005; Girardone et al., 2006) . These studies actually compare the performance of different types of banks (such as cooperative with savings and commercial banks, government-owned with private banks, listed with non-listed banks, or foreign with domestic banks) and consequently do not examine the board structure aspects of corporate governance mechanisms.
indicate that bank holding companies have board size significantly larger that those of manufacturing firms.
A review of the empirical evidence on the impact of board size on performance shows mixed results. Dehaene et al. (2001) find that board size is positively related to company performance. However, the results of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) are inconclusive. Using a market return measure of performance, their results suggest that a large board is seen as less effective in monitoring performance, but when accounting returns are used, large boards seem to provide the firms with the diversity in contacts, experience and expertise needed to enhance performance. Yermack (1996) finds an inverse relationship between board size and firm value; in addition, financial ratios related to profitability and operating efficiency also appear to decline as board size grows. Finally, Connelly and Limpaphayom (2004) find that board size does not have any relation with firm performance. Fama and Jensen (1983) However, there is also a fair amount of studies that tend not to support this positive perspective. Some of them report a negative and statistically significant relationship with Tobin's Q (e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996) while others find no significant relationship between accounting performance measures and the proportion of non-executive directors (e.g. Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998; Weir et al., 2002; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) . Furthermore, based on a large survey of firms with non-executive directors in the Netherlands, Hooghiemstra and van Manen (2004) conclude that stakeholders are not generally satisfied with the way non-executives operate. Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) summarize a number of views expressed in the literature which may justify this non-positive relationship, such as that high proportion of non-executive directors may engulf the company in excessive monitoring, be harmful to companies as they may stifle strategic actions, lack real independence, and lack the business knowledge to be truly effective (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Patton and Baker, 1987; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994) .
Board composition
Evidence from the banking industry
Adams and Mehran (2005) sample indicate that board size is positively related to the market-to-book ratio and ROIC and negatively related to ROA, however it is insignificant in most cases. The exception is the interaction effect of the Anglo-Saxon family (UK-Ireland) with board size, which has a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. As for the proportion of non-executives there is a positive and significant relationship with ROIC, weak evidence (at the 10% level) for its association with non-executives, and no evidence of an association with market-to-book ratio. However, the interaction effect of non-executive ratio with the Anglo-Saxon family is negative and statistically significant in all cases. Finally, using a sample of large publicly traded US commercial banks, Pi and Timme (1993) find that cost efficiency and return on assets are not significantly related to the proportion of inside (outside) directors.
Data and Methodology
Data
Our starting point for data collection is the December 2006 list of the Bank of England's "Institutions included within the United Kingdom banking sector -nationality analysis". We focus on institutions classified as UK ones, and we excluded banks with no available financial data in the Bankscope database of Bureau van Dijk.
We also excluded banks for which we could not find any information on board structure (i.e. board composition or size) either in FAME database of 
Data envelopment analysis
As mentioned earlier we use three measures of banks' efficiency. Technical efficiency (TE) indicates whether a bank uses the minimum quantity of inputs to produce given quantity of outputs. Allocative efficiency (AE) refers to the ability of a bank to use the optimum mix of inputs given their respective prices. Finally, cost efficiency (CE), which is the product of TE and AE, shows the ability of a bank to provide services without wasting resources as a result of technical or allocative efficiency.
These measures of efficiency are calculated with DEA that uses linear programming for the development of production frontiers and the measurement of efficiency relative to the developed frontiers (Charnes et al., 1978) . The best-practice production frontier for a sample of decision making units (DMUs), in our case banks, is constructed through a piecewise linear combination of actual input-output correspondence set that envelops the input-output correspondence of all DMUs in the sample (Thanassoulis, 2001 ). Each DMU is assigned an efficiency score that ranges between 0 and 1, with a score equal to 1 indicating an efficient DMU with respect to the rest of the DMUs in the sample. A more technical discussion of DEA can be found in Appendix A.
Following the majority of recent studies, we use the intermediation approach for the selection of inputs and outputs (e.g. Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004) and estimate an input-oriented model 2 . The three inputs used in the present study are: fixed assets (X 1 ), deposits and short term funding (X 2 ) and staff expenses (X 3 ). The two outputs are: loans (Y 1 ), and other earning assets (i.e. liquid assets and investments) (Y 2 ). The input prices are calculated as: non-interest expenses (excluding personnel expenses) to fixed assets (P1), interest expenses to deposits (P2), and personnel expenses to total assets (P3).
As in Isik and Hassan (2002) and Pasiouras et al. (2007) among others, we estimate separate annual efficiency frontiers rather than a common frontier across time. Isik and Hassan (2002) point out the following two advantages of this approach.
First, it is more flexible and thus more appropriate than estimating a single multiyear frontier for the banks in the sample. Second, it alleviates, at least to an extent, the problems related to the lack of random error in DEA by allowing an efficient bank in one year to be inefficient in another, under the assumption that the errors owing to luck or data problems are not consistent over time. While our sample appears to be small in absolute terms for cross-section (DEA) estimations, it should be mentioned that it is comparable to several previous studies that examine efficiency in the banking 2 It should be mentioned that the input-and output-oriented models provide always the same value under constant return to scale and are unequal only when variable return to scale is assumed. In any case, Coelli et al. (1999) mention that since linear programming does not suffer from statistical problems as simultaneous equation bias, the choice of an appropriate orientation is not as crucial as it is in the case of econometric orientation, and it many instances, the choice of orientation has only a minor influence upon the scores obtained (Coelli and Perelman, 1996) . sector 3 . After all, one of the most well known advantages of DEA is that it works well with small samples.
Tobit regression
On the basis of the discussion in Section 2, and the recommendations of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999, 2006) we formulate and test two hypotheses. Given that both the size and the composition of the board appear to have some impact on the performance which is however unclear, our hypotheses are as follows:
H1: Other things being equal, the efficiency of banks is related to the size of the board of directors.
H2: Other things being equal, the efficiency of banks is related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board.
Using the bank efficiency measures as the dependent variable, we employ Tobit regression to estimate the parameters of the following equations
where BEF it refers to the efficiency measures of bank i in year t; BSIZE it refers to the natural logarithm of the number of directors (executives and non-executives) in the 3 For example, Apergis and Rezitis (2004) and Rezitis (2006) examine six banks, Karafolas and Mantakas (1996) examine eleven banks, Pasiouras et al. (2008) examine ten banks. Chu and Lim (1998) also examine as few as six banks, Neal (2004) examines twelve banks while in a previous UK study Drake (2001) examines only nine banks.
board of bank i in year t; BCOMP it refers to the proportion of non-executive directors in the board, calculated as the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of board directors of bank i in year t; B Qit is a set of bank-specific control variables, and T is a time trend.
The first bank-specific control variable, LNTA, controls for size, and is represented by the natural logarithm of total assets. The second bank-specific variable, EQAS, is a proxy for capitalization calculated by the ratio of equity to total assets. The time trend takes the value of 1 for 2000, 2 for 2001, and so on.
Consistent with several previous studies we use Tobit regression rather than OLS as the dependent variable, the bank efficiency measure, ranges between 0 and 1.
As Saxonhouse (1976) Adams and Mehran (2003) for the U.S but higher than the ones of the present study. Zulkafli and Samad (2007) on the other hand report an average equal to 10.39 over the 9 Asian countries that they examine.
Empirical results
The proportion of non-executives in the board takes values between 30% and 76% (approximately) with an average around 56.2% which is lower than most of the previous studies 4 . However, Alonso and Gonzalez (2006) report a similar figure for the UK (59%) although the average over the seven countries they examine is 81%.
[Insert Table 1 Around Here] Panels A to C in Table 2 present the results of Tobit regression with dependent variables TE, AE, and CE respectively. Columns 1 and 2 show the results when we examine the impact of board size and board composition individually, whereas column 3 accounts for the simultaneous impact of both variables. In all cases, we control for equity to assets, bank size and time.
[Insert Table 2 
Conclusions
The corporate governance of banks is an important issue that has been highlighted in the reports of oversight bodies such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as well as in several recent studies. For example, Levine (2004) mentions that due to the importance of banks in the economy, the governance of banks themselves assumes a central role. More precisely, sound governance mechanisms of banks will most likely result in a more efficient allocation of capital and exert corporate governance over the firms they fund. At the same time, bank managers that are allowed to act in their own interest rather than the interest of banks' owners will most likely allocate funds less efficiently and will not exert effective governance over firms. Furthermore, informational asymmetries are larger with banks (Furfine, 2001 ). Yet, the studies that focus on the impact of governance mechanisms on the banking industry in general, and the performance of banks in particular, are relatively scarce compared to the ones that examine non-financial firms.
In the present study, we focused on a controversial issue that has generated a theoretical debate and has provided mixed empirical results. More precisely, we examined the impact of board size and composition on the performance of firms, in our case UK banks. In contrast to most of the previous studies we focused on the technical, allocative and cost efficiency of banks, an exercise that to the best of our knowledge has so far been undertaken only in the U.S. Future research could extend our study by considering a longer time period, and by examining additional corporate governance mechanisms. The latter was not pursued in our present study, given that our sample size has been limited to 18 banks operating over the period 2001-2006, as we have been able to gather board structure data only for that many banks using annual reports. As an extension of this study, it would also be interesting to examine the relationship between efficiency and board structure in a cross-country setting, in line with previous studies in banking that have considered other measures of performance such as Tobin's Q or the return on assets. Notes: TE = Technical efficiency; AE = Allocative efficiency; CE = Cost efficiency; BCOMP = (number of nonexecutives / total number of board members) x 100; EQAS = (Equity/Total assets) x 100; BSIZE = Total number of board members; TAS = Total assets in mil GBP; LNBSIZE = natural logarithm of BSIZE; LNTAS = natural logarithm of TAS Notes: *** Statistically significant at the 1% level, ** Statistically significant at the 5% level, * Statistically significant at the 10% level; z-test in parentheses; N = number of observations in the regression; TE = Technical efficiency; AE = Allocative efficiency; CE = Cost efficiency; EQAS = equity to total assets; LNTAS = natural logarithm of total assets; TIME = time trend; LNBSIZE = natural logarithm of the total number of board directors; COMP = the proportion of non-executives in the board; QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates are reported. That is, CE is the ratio of minimum cost to observed cost, for the i-th bank.
The (input-mix) allocative efficiency (AE) is calculated as AE = CE/TE. All three measures can take values between 0 and 1 with higher values indicating higher efficiency.
